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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-11-10 DOES NOT 
REQUIRE THE FILING OF A BOND IN ANY ACTION 
BROUGHT l\Gl\INST AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAPPENS 
TO BE A POLICE OFFICER. 
Respondent argues that defendants were acting as 
police officers at the time of the incident in question, there-
fore, ipso facto, a bond is required under U.C.A. §78-11-10, 
if they are sued. Defendants' position is precisely that 
position argued by the defendants in Wright v. Lee, 104 Utah 
90, 138 P.2d 246 (1943) (as explained in appellant's Brief, 
Wright v. Lee, 101 Utah 76, 118 P.2d 132 (1941) went to the 
Supreme Court of Utah a second time and is hereinafter 
referred to as Wright II). Wright II soundly rejected 
defendants' argument, using the following rationale expressed 
by Justice Wade: 
Plaintiff concedes that the defendants 
were officers charged with the enforce-
ment of the criminal laws ... 
The defendants' evidence merely shows 
that they were police officers, and as such 
were instructed by their superior to make 
an investigation of the plaintiff, in connec-
tion with the writing of certain letters and 
with certain robberies, and that they made 
the arrest. They further testified that all 
the acts, alleged in the complaint, which 
they did, were done pursuant to and in the 
course of such performance of their duty 
as such officers. The testimony on the matters 
stated in the last sentence were the bald con-
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clusions of the witnesses, and no facts or 
circumstances in support thereof were given ... 
The mere fact that they were officers and ~ere 
instructed to make an investigation of the 
plaintiff does not prove that the acts that 
they did were done in the course of the pe~­
formance of their duty, nor does it prove that 
their acts arose out of the performance thereof. 
Nor is this shown by the conclusion to that 
effect. Such testimony may be admissible to sho•,; 
the purpose of the witnesses in corrunitting the 
acts, still that question must be ultimatelv 
determined by the court from all the facts ~nd 
circu~stances surrounding the corrunission of the 
acts in questions. (Emphasis added) . 
Wright v. Lee, supra, at 249. 
In the instant case, the defendants submitted 
Affidavits purporting to show that at the time of the in-
cident, they were acting in their capacity as police officerc. 
These are self serving statements no different than thos~ 
made by the defendants in Wright II. The trial judge, •J11Jer 
the holding of Wrighi.:___!!, cannot require that plaintiff 
post a bond merely because the defendants are police officers. 
Rather, the Wright cases require that a hearing be held to 
determine whether the officers were acting outside the sco~ 
of their authority. If so, no bonu is required of a plainti'.:. 
In the instant case a hearing was never held to 
determine whether the defendants, even though they were e~~~ 
as police officers by Ogden City, were acting within ti~ 
scope of their duties and authority. Llecause of the brutal 
nature of the assault on plaintiff, the evidence rtoes tend 
to support the allegation that the defenuants were not a·~tinc 
within the scope of their duties ciml aullrnrit/. 
in the Wright cases require th0r t Ile ti·iLil court !1Li·:c " 
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on this matter, and plaintiff need not post a bond. 
The respondents also contend that the hearing 
afforded the plaintiff by the holdings in the Wright 
cases, will require a fullfledged trial and thus frustrate 
the bond statue. This conclusion is not borne out 
by a careful reading of those cases. Rather, they 
require a pretrial hearing by the the trial judge 
as to this matter, with the trial judge furnishing findings 
of fact to support his decision. 
POINT II 
THE BOND SHOULD BE WAIVED SINCE APPELLANT 
PROCEEDED IN FORMA PAUPERIS BY FILING AN 
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY AND REQUESTING 
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE TO WAIVE THE BOND. 
The trial record includes a copy of plaintiff's 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity. On page 10 of the transcript's 
Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiff's attorney described plain-
tiff's poor economic state and requested that the judge waive the 
bond. On the transcript's same page, plaintiff's attorney 
argues that under the circumstances, before the court, a 
bond need not be filed. Plaintiff's attorney further states 
that if the judge differs with plaintiff's position, the 
judge has the discretion to set the bond and plaintiff would 
request that no amount be set by the court so that the 
plaintiff could have his day in court. 
The question as to whether a bond should be required 
of an impecunious plaintiff is a novel one in the State of 
-3-
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Utah as is the question of the constitutionality of requitinc 
a bond in all instances. In the interest of judicial E:cono~,,·, 
the plaintiff respectfully urges this Court to address the 
question now. 
In the past, this Court has intimated that a 
constitutional issue need not be raised at the trial court 
level in every instance in order to be considered on appeal. 
In State v. Sheldon, 545 P.2d 513 (Ut. 1976), the Court de-
clined to consider a constitutional issue on appeal, since 
the transcript of the record did not reveal that the issue 
had been raised at the trial level. In a long dissent, 
Justice Maughan, relying in part on In Re Clark's Estate, 
argued that the Court should consider constitutional issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. Justice Maughan noted 
that the ordinance in question appeared on its face to raise 
a question of voidness for vagueness, a point especially 
pertinent in view of the constitutional question appellant 
is raising here. 
Justice Maughan' s dissent relies in part on Article 
8, Section 9, Utah State Constitution, which provides that: 
From all final judgments of the district 
courts, there shall be a right of appeal to 
the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon 
the record made in the court below and under 
such regulations as may be provided by law. 
In equity cases the appeal may be on questions 
of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal 
shall be on questions of law alone. Appeals 
shall also lie from the final orders and decrees 
of the Court in the administration of decedent 
estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall 
-4-
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be provided by law. Appeals shall also lie 
from the final judgment of Justices of the 
peace in civil and criminal cases to the District 
Courts on both questions of law and fact, with 
such limitations and restrictions as shall be 
provided by law; and the decision of the 
District Courts on such appeals shall be final, 
except in cases involving the validity or con-
stitutionality of a statute. 
Justice Maughan further states in Sheldon: 
"The Constitution does not say that the con-
stitutional issue must first be raised in the 
court below. It simply, and forthrightly pro-
vides jurisdiction for this court to consider 
the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance, 
when it appears that such is involved." Id. at 
515-6. 
l\ppellant contends that if U.C.A. §78-11-10 (1977) 
requires a bond to be posted, regardless of the financial 
plight of an impecunious plaintiff, then such a requirement 
is void on its face as violative of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as 
pointed out in the discussion of Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
The case of In Re Clark's Estate, 74 P.2d 401 (1937), 
(Cited by Justice Haughan in Sheld~i:i_), held that a constitutional 
question decisive of an appeal by the state on an inheritance 
tax matter could be considered even though the constitutional 
issue was first raised by the Court itself on appeal. The 
Court reached this decision despite the fact that, in its 
words, "the constitutional question h'as neither suggested, 
briefed or argued in the case pr"-or to its decision." Id. at 405. 
Because of the importance of the Constitutional 
issue raised here, plaintiff-appellant urges this Court to 
address the issue CJt this t in1c. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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POINT 1 II 
RESPONDENT'S RELIANCE ON UNITED STATES v. KPJ\S 
IS MISPLACED, BECAUSE KRAS INVOLVED A. BANKRUP'fey 
CASE AND NOT A CIVIL SUIT FOR REDRESS FOR PEPSon~.l 
INJURY. 
Plaintiff wishes to point out that the circu1"stJriCE: 
here are different than those in the case of United States 
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). K1·,1s is o. bankruptcy case. 
It differs from this case in that there are means other than 
a judicial proceeding for a debtor to obtain relief from his 
creditors. 
"Nor is the Government's control over the 
the establishment, enforcement, or dissolu-
tion of debts nearly so exclusive as Connecticut's 
control over the marriage relationship in 
Boddie. In contrast with divorce, bankruptcy 
is not the only method available to a debtor 
for the adjustment of his legal relationship 
with his creditors .... 
However unrealistic the remedy may be in 
a particular situation, a debtor, in theory, 
and after in actuality, majy adjust his debts 
by negotiated agreement with his creditors. 
At times the happy passage of the applicable 
limitation period, or other acceptable creditor 
arrangement, will provide the answer. Government's 
role with respect to the private commercial 
relationship is qualitatively and quantitatively 
different from its role in the establishment, 
enforcement, and dissolution of marriage. 
Resort to the court, therefore, is not Kras' 
sole path to relief. Baddie's emphasis on 
exclusively finds no counterpart in the bank-
rupt's situation." Id. at 445-6. 
Plaintiff contends that redress for injuries because I 
of a tort committed upon one's person lies solely in 0n actir·'·, 
at law. Self-help has long since been denied injured parties I 
s i nee I because it w6uld tend to cause a breach of the peace. 
plaintiff's only remedy is an actinn at lav1, to deny an im- I 
-6-
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pccunious plaintiff his day in court would violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as pointed out in 
Boddie v. Connecticut (supra). There the Court said: 
"Thus, although they assert here due process 
rights as would-be plaintiff, we think appellants' 
plight, because resort to the state courts is the 
only avenue to dissolution of their marriages, is 
akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion 
from the only forum effectively empowered to settle 
their disputes. Resort to the judicial process 
by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a 
realistic sense than that of the defendant called 
upon to defend his interests in Court. For both 
groups this process is not only the paramount 
dispute settlement technique, but, in fact, the 
only available one." (Emphasis added). 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 372, 376-77. (1970) 
In the recent case of Lecates v. Justice of the 
Peace Court No. 4 of the State of Delaware, et. al., 637 F.2d 
898 (3rd Cir. 1980), the Circuit Court addressed the issue of 
whether the Boddie holding applies to a civil case (other than 
divorce) and concluded than it docs. 
In the Lecates case, appellant, Richard Lecates, 
had had a trial before a justice of the peace regarding whether 
the repossession of his automobile and the resale were in 
violation of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Justice of the 
Peace, who was not trained in law, ruled against Mr. Lecates. 
In Delaware, an unsuccessful party in a justice of the peace 
court is entitled to a trial de novo in Superior Court, but 
a losing defendant must first post a surety bond to obtain such 
a trial. The bond was nonwaivable even for indigent plaintiffs. 
The Circuit Court went on to hold that the nonwaivable 
bond in a civil case such as this violated Lecates' Due Process 
rights. On pp. 18-19 the Court stc1tes: 
-7-
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Boddie directly supports the proposition that 
an ind_igent civil defendant such as Lecates has a 
right 6f equal recourse to the complete range of 
the trial machinery by which the state declares 
legal rights and imposes leyal obligations. Al-
though the Supreme Court in Boddie was concerned 
with establishing a right of initial access for 
a plaintiff, Justice Harlan supported the Court's 
holding that a state cannot erect financial barriers 
to access to state-controlled divorce proceedings 
by analogizing the position of a person seeking a 
divorce to that of a civil defendant. Both are at 
the mercy of the government, which holds exclusive 
dominion over the means to secure or protect the 
respective legal rights and interests. Both the 
person desiring a divorce and a defendant involun-
tarily hauled into court have no realistic alterna- I 
tive but to pursue the judicial processes established I 
by the sovereign. As Justice Harlan observed, the 
"successful invocation of this governmental power ' 
[the court system] by plaintiffs has often created 
serious problems for defendants' rights. For 
at that point, the judicial proceeding becomes 
the only effective means of resolving the dispute 
at hand and denial of a defendant's full access 
to that process raises grave problems for its 
legitimacy." 401 U.S. 371. This wisdom would 
seem to be applicable to Lecates' plight. 
The Court on pp. 20-21 rejected the argument that Boddie appii9'\ 
only to a marriage-divorce situation and, rather, concludedtro:I 
I 
it applies to civil cases in general. 
The reasoning displayed in Justice Harlan's 
extensive discussion in Boddie of the rights of 
defendants therefore remains viable because as he 
recognized, the judicial system is the exclusive 
peaceful means by which a defendant may protect 
his rights and interests. 
Thus, the central wisdom of Boddie informs 
our resolution of the present case: "Due process 
requires, at a minimum that absent a counter-
vailing state interest of overriding significance, 
persons forced to settle their claims of right 
and duty through the judidical process must be 
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." 
401 U.S. at 377. 
-8-
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-As in Delaware, the Utah Constitution also guarantees 
a right to trial for "any civil cause", as was pointed out in 
appellant's brief. 
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for 
an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or un-
necessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party. 
The mandated access is, for it speaks of "an injury done to 
him in his person, property, or reputation." The last clause 
is especially instructive: "no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in the State, ... 
any civil cause to which he is a party." To foreclose plain-
tiff from bringing his civil action for personal injuries done 
to his person would conflict with Section 11 of Article I, Utah 
Constitution. Thus, it can be seen, that the right to a trial 
for redress for a personal injury is an inalienable right under 
the State Constitution and should not be denied a plaintiff 
merely because he is unable to pay for a bond as required by 
U.C.A. §78-11-10. 
In conclusion, appellant urges this Court to recognize 
the mandate set out by Boddie and to hold that the bond require-
ment of U.C.A. §78-11-10 is unconstitutional, unless there is 
allowance for its waiver in the case of an indigent plaintiff. 
DATED this 1981. 
PAUL GOTAY 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
__J 
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